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Institutional complexity and individual responses: delineating the boundaries of partial 15 
autonomy 16 
Abstract 17 
Research highlights how co-existing institutional logics can sometimes offer opportunities for 18 
agency to enterprising actors in organizational fields. But macro- and micro-level studies 19 
using this framework diverge in their approach to understanding the consequences of 20 
institutional complexity for actor autonomy, and correspondingly in the opportunities they 21 
identify for agents to resist, reinterpret or make judicious use of institutional prescriptions. 22 
This paper seeks to bridge this gap, through a longitudinal, comparative case study of the 23 
trajectories of four ostensibly similar change initiatives in the same complex organizational 24 
field. It studies the influence of three dominant institutional logics (professional, market and 25 
corporate) in these divergent trajectories, elucidating the role of mediating influences, 26 
operating below the level of the field but above that of the actor, that worked to constrain or 27 
facilitate agency. The consequence for actors was a divergent realization of the relationship 28 
between the three logics, with very different consequences for their ability to advance their 29 
interests. Our findings offer an improved understanding of when and how institutional 30 
complexity facilitates autonomy, and suggests mediating influences at the level of the 31 
organization and the relationship it instantiates between carriers of logics, neglected by 32 
macro- and micro-level studies, that merit further attention. 33 
Keywords 34 
Institutions; institutional logics; healthcare; professionalism; managerialism; markets; 35 
National Health Service; England 36 
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Introduction 37 
Academic understanding of conformity, differentiation and change in organizational fields 38 
has been advanced in recent years by a burgeoning literature drawing on the concept of 39 
institutional logics. From its foundations in neo-institutionalism, the institutional logics 40 
perspective has rapidly advanced to theorize how diverse institutional forces not only 41 
compete for dominance, but also frequently interact and co-exist, and how this affects 42 
organizational and individual behaviour. It offers a rich explanatory framework that accounts 43 
for heterogeneity as well as conformity, and which better allows for the potential of agency as 44 
well as structure in enacting, contesting and transforming institutions. 45 
Within this approach, a particularly vibrant thread of research has focused on the 46 
consequences of institutional complexity—that is, the presence of multiple logics with 47 
conflicting, or at least diverging, prescriptions for behaviour. At the macro level, theoretical 48 
and empirical studies have, as a rule, found that institutional complexity adds further 49 
constraints to organizations’ and individuals’ behaviour, since it poses expectations from 50 
additional audiences, all of whom must be satisfied for legitimacy (Pache & Santos 2010; 51 
Kraatz & Block 2008). Yet such predictions have not always been borne out in micro-level 52 
studies of individual behaviour under conditions of complexity, which often find that actors 53 
‘on the ground’ exercise a remarkable degree of autonomy in their day-to-day practice (e.g. 54 
Hallett 2010). The objective of this study, therefore, is to attempt to bridge this gap, through a 55 
longitudinal comparative case study of the consequences of a period of intensifying 56 
institutional complexity for actor autonomy, in the English National Health Service (NHS). 57 
Existing theory predicts that this period of change, which saw the increasing centralization 58 
and formalization of institutional expectations (Pache & Santos 2010; Greenwood et al. 2011; 59 
Thornton 2002), would impose more exacting expectations on individual-level behaviour. 60 
But we found a mixed picture, with two cases remaining recalcitrant to changing institutional 61 
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prescriptions, while in two others actors’ behaviour was more conforming. We seek to add to 62 
an emerging literature on organizational-level factors in the constitution of institutional logics 63 
(e.g. Besharov & Smith 2014) by elucidating this meso-level influence on the degree of 64 
latitude enjoyed by actors in the face of apparently determinative institutional prescriptions. 65 
In so doing, we outline alternative forms of organizational influence on the experience of 66 
logics ‘on the ground’, and begin to identify the building blocks for a bridge between macro-67 
level and micro-level work on institutional logics that has to date been missing. We respond 68 
to calls for research that takes seriously the partial and contingent nature of agency in 69 
institutional fields (Thornton et al. 2012; Greenwood et al. 2010; Waldorff et al. 2013), and 70 
accounts for institutional complexity more adequately by considering more than two logics 71 
(Greenwood et al. 2010; 2011; Goodrick & Reay 2011). 72 
We begin by reviewing the institutional logics literature, including its propositions on 73 
how logics co-exist, and how actors respond to this. We highlight the disconnection between 74 
macro- and micro-level studies, and argue that, while micro-level studies have gone some 75 
way to fulfilling their promise of returning neo-institutionalism to its ‘microfoundations’ 76 
(Powell & Colyvas 2008), the methodological approaches predominant in this literature mean 77 
that in aggregate it risks overstating the “avenues for partial autonomy” (Thornton et al. 2012, 78 
p.7) available to individual actors. Then we briefly describe our empirical setting, a 79 
particularly complex institutional field in terms of the dimensions set out by Greenwood et al. 80 
(2011). After accounting for our methods, we explore the dynamics of institutional change 81 
and the divergent consequences for our four cases through time. We then discuss our findings 82 
and their implications for theory and future research. 83 
Institutional logics: coexistence and its consequences 84 
Over the last 15-20 years, the institutional logics approach has offered an increasingly 85 
sophisticated means of accounting for change and stability in organizational fields. 86 
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Institutional logics are “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, 87 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 88 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 89 
(Thornton & Ocasio 1998, p.804). In other words, institutional logics are the key means by 90 
which social reality is reproduced and changed. Distinctive domains of social practice—91 
organizational fields—have their own sets of institutional logics, derived from societal-level 92 
logics, from the logics of neighbouring fields, and from the endogenous action of the 93 
individuals who populate them (Thornton et al. 2012). 94 
Formative research within the institutional logics approach focused primarily on the 95 
dominance of given logics: how this was created, maintained and challenged (e.g. Scott et al. 96 
2000). Increasingly, however, research has found that many fields are characterized by the 97 
co-existence of a plurality of logics—often with no single logic dominant in determining 98 
actors’ disposition and behaviour. Rather than representing a temporary, transitional phase 99 
between epochs of dominance by a single logic, “some fields are better portrayed as leaning 100 
towards the ‘relative incoherence’ of enduring, competing logics” (Greenwood et al. 2011, 101 
p.323). Greenwood et al. (2011, p.332) note that research on institutional complexity has 102 
tended to assume that coexisting logics are “inherently incompatible,” but more recent studies 103 
have challenged this assumption. Several have found that contradictory logics may coexist in 104 
an organizational field, often in a kind of ‘creative tension’ which means that their influences 105 
affect actors simultaneously (e.g. Reay & Hinings 2005; 2009; Lounsbury 2007; Greenwood 106 
et al. 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011; self-citation). The plurality of institutional prescriptions 107 
available means that a diversity of actor behaviours is often in evidence: for example, 108 
Lounsbury (2007) finds that different fund managers operate according to ‘trustee’ and 109 
‘performance’ logics concurrently, depending on their geographical location. 110 
The presence of divergent behaviours, however, should not automatically be interpreted 111 
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as signalling greater actor autonomy. The influence of logics, studies have found, is often 112 
‘segmented’, such that different groups of actors are affected differentially by logics’ 113 
prescriptions (Reay & Hinings 2009; Pache & Santos 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011). Reay 114 
and Hinings (2009, p.646), for example, find that the rivalry between an incumbent logic of 115 
medical professionalism and an increasingly powerful logic of business-like healthcare is 116 
managed by collaboration between physicians and administrators, with each group 117 
maintaining its independence but engaging “in collaborations that result in mutually desirable 118 
outcomes and thus sustain the co-existing logics.” Often, therefore, studies of sustained 119 
institutional complexity find that carriers of different logics—for example, professional and 120 
managerial groups—remain bound to their ‘home’ logics and referent audiences, and are able 121 
to continue to act in accordance with their expectations. Alternatively, the same group of 122 
actors may have to satisfy the expectations of more than one audience for legitimacy, such 123 
that different aspects of their practice are governed by different logics (e.g. Smets et al. 124 
2015). 125 
To observe that multiple logics are available within a field, therefore, is not to imply 126 
that individuals are able to pick and choose freely from their prescriptions. Due to their prior 127 
socialization, the expectations of their referent audiences, and other structural determinants, 128 
actors continue to face the constraints presented by the need for legitimacy, as identified by 129 
the earliest exponents of neo-institutionalism. The most recent developments in our 130 
understanding of the consequences of institutionally complex fields for actor autonomy 131 
arguably retain this structural focus. A promising recent line of inquiry is the consequences of 132 
the specific configuration of logics in a field: the ‘constellation’ in which they are formed 133 
(Reay & Hinings 2009; Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 2013). The same logics may 134 
be configured differently in different fields, with important consequences for actor behaviour, 135 
as Waldorff et al. (2013) demonstrate with a comparison of Danish and Canadian healthcare. 136 
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A similar set of logics existed in each setting, but they were arranged in rather different 137 
constellations, so that a complementary relationship between market and professional logics 138 
in Canada led to changes in behaviour that did not arise in Denmark, where the relationship 139 
was more antagonistic. Waldorff et al. (2013, p.125) claim that “the concept of constellation 140 
of logics [offers] a new way of understanding agency. We see that it is the arrangement and 141 
relationship among logics that helps to explain how action can be both constrained and 142 
enabled.” Yet their analysis remains at the level of the field: the constellation of logics is a 143 
product of field-level dynamics (most notably, in this example, incentive structures and 144 
regulatory regimes), and these determine the repertoires available to different actors. There is 145 
less sense in such analyses of the way, as Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013, p.1301) have it, 146 
“constellations are constructed rather than given, and which dimensions of agency drive their 147 
construction.” 148 
Partly in response to the shortcomings of the macro-level focus of much of the work on 149 
institutional logics, another—largely separate—body of literature considers the micro-level 150 
enactment of logics by individuals at the ‘coalface’ (Barley 2008) of everyday work—that is, 151 
the unremarkable, day-to-day interactions of actors in institutionalized fields, far removed 152 
from the battles between institutions and high-level institutional entrepreneurs. Scholars in 153 
this line argue that much neo-institutional research neglects “interpretation and subjectivity, 154 
which […] offers considerable degrees of agency and freedom to reinterpret and even change 155 
institutional templates” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015). Where institutionalists have considered 156 
agency, they have focused disproportionately on what Smets et al. (2012, p.878) call 157 
“‘hypermuscular’ institutional entrepreneurship”: the work of “heroic actors” (Powell & 158 
Colyvas 2008, p.277) with unusual levels of individual or collective clout, who feed back into 159 
the constitution of institutional logics themselves (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2002; Murray 2010). 160 
What this neglects, critics argue, is the everyday work of lower-profile actors who 161 
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nevertheless are active in their interpretation and application of institutional logics. 162 
Accordingly, work on ‘inhabited institutions’ (Hallett & Ventresca 2006) has examined 163 
the lived experience of actors in institutionalized fields, and the practices they pursue, 164 
consciously or unconsciously, that reproduce or challenge institutional expectations. Often 165 
deploying ethnomethodological approaches, these studies highlight the interpretive, non-166 
deterministic processes that translate situations of institutional complexity into day-to-day 167 
reality (e.g. Heimer 1999; Binder 2007; Hallett 2010; Everitt 2013; McPherson & Sauder 168 
2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; Smets et al. 2015). They vividly demonstrate Powell and 169 
Colyvas’s  (2008, p.277) assertion that a division between “heroic actors and cultural dopes 170 
[is] a poor representation of the gamut of human behavior.” For example, Binder (2007) 171 
shows how professionals in different parts of the same organization meld together 172 
institutional demands, personal beliefs and localized meaning systems in the way they enact 173 
their organization’s mission. Everitt (2013) looks at the professional socialization of teachers 174 
as agentic and active, combining institutional prescriptions with social influences and 175 
personal preferences. Such work focuses above all on the everyday work of actors who are 176 
not in the business of “intentionally pursuing a clear institutional ‘vision’” (Smets & 177 
Jarzabkowski 2013, p.1300): they are not seeking to transform the rules of the game in an 178 
institutional field, but to forge a legitimate path through complex organizational settings 179 
characterized by a profusion of prescriptions, power relationships and personal interests 180 
(Smets et al. 2015). 181 
Taken together, these studies provide an important corrective to neo-institutionalism’s 182 
focus on the power of institutional logics. Yet their key methodological advantage—detailed 183 
examination of practice as it takes place in real-life environments—also creates a limitation. 184 
With few exceptions, these papers offer in-depth understanding of single organizations or 185 
even single organizational sub-units, rather than cross-sectional comparisons. This means that 186 
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they are unlikely to reveal organizational-level contingencies in the way that, for example, a 187 
comparative case-study approach might. They also tend to ascribe a remarkable degree of 188 
autonomy to individual actors—perhaps in consequence of case selection, or of a desire to 189 
challenge the structuralist predictions of macro-level studies, or of the preferences of journals 190 
for studies that indicate new or unexpected findings. In aggregate, these studies suggest that 191 
actors enjoy a great deal of latitude, in contradiction to the findings of the macro-level 192 
institutionalist literature. If a macro-level focus fetishizes structure, then a risk of a micro-193 
level focus is fetishizing agency. Thus, echoing Hardy and Maguire’s (2008, p.199) critique 194 
of the institutional entrepreneurship literature, we need to “ensure that the efforts of 195 
institutional theorists to incorporate agency—in order to move beyond an over-emphasis on 196 
the constraining effects of institutions—do not swing too far in the opposite direction.” 197 
What has been less prominent in the literature is examination of the circumstances in 198 
which such agency is possible. With this in mind, our study considers the consequences of 199 
institutional complexity, and rapid institutional change, in four organizations in the same 200 
field, which exhibited divergent outcomes in terms of the room for manoeuvre achieved by 201 
the central actors, each of whom sought to maintain a novel service intervention that became 202 
misaligned with the prescriptions of the dominant logic within the field. We sacrifice the 203 
ethnomethodological depth of the ‘inhabited institutions’ tradition for comparative breadth, 204 
but nevertheless offer a detailed, qualitative, longitudinal study covering seven years of 205 
change. Our approach is not without precedent: the work of Reay and Hinings (2005; 2009) 206 
similarly combines field-level analysis with qualitative interviews with key actors, but 207 
whereas their focus is the consequences for the composition of the field, ours is the 208 
consequences for the autonomy of everyday actors (not muscular institutional entrepreneurs) 209 
at the coalface. Whereas the success of institutional entrepreneurs is often attributed to the 210 
power deriving from their social position or to exceptional creative vision (Hardy & Maguire 211 
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2008), we address the question of what enables or constrains these ‘coalface’ actors, who 212 
cannot rely on such attributes, in acting autonomously. We ask: what are the conditions that 213 
precipitate and inhibit actors’ ability to defy changing institutional prescriptions in defence of 214 
their own beliefs and interests? 215 
Institutional logics in English healthcare, 2005-2011 216 
The field of healthcare is quintessentially institutionally complex. It has offered a fertile 217 
ground for the development of institutional theory, with key contributions arising from 218 
analysis of healthcare systems globally (e.g. Scott et al. 2000; Reay & Hinings 2005). As 219 
Pache and Santos (2010) note, healthcare is a fragmented field where stakeholders from a 220 
wide range of logics co-exist, but is also dependent on a small number of resource providers 221 
(in England’s case, the state). “The most complex fields for organizations to navigate,” argue 222 
Pache and Santos (2010, p.458), “are moderately centralized fields” of this kind, 223 
“characterized by the competing influence of multiple and misaligned players whose 224 
influence is not dominant yet is potent enough to be imposed on organizations.” Besharov 225 
and Smith (2014) conceptualize such fields as combining ‘high centrality’ (with multiple 226 
logics central to organizational functioning) with ‘low compatibility’ (because the logics’ 227 
prescriptions are contradictory), and suggest that such fields produce ‘contested’ 228 
organizations characterized by extensive conflict. 229 
In common with healthcare systems worldwide (e.g. Scott et al. 2000), the NHS is the 230 
site of long-term conflict among logics. Of particular note is the influence of the professional, 231 
corporate and market logics. The professional logic in healthcare can be characterized as the 232 
dominance of professionals over not just clinical but organizational decision-making, and 233 
deference among others (managers, patients and lower-status clinicians) to (medical) 234 
professional knowledge (Reay & Hinings 2009). The market and corporate logics are 235 
sometimes conflated (e.g. [self-citation]), but we follow Thornton (2002) in distinguishing 236 
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between them as two potentially complementary, but conceptually separate, institutional 237 
logics. The corporate logic is realized through managerial techniques for controlling 238 
professionals’ activity, for example performance-management regimes, standardization of 239 
clinical care, and development of capacity for surveillance and audit. The market logic 240 
represents a shift towards use of competition among providers and market signals to induce 241 
improvement and contain costs. Traditionally dominated by medical professionalism, the 242 
English system was subject to increasing managerial and market influences from the 1980s 243 
onward, as the state sought to challenge professional jurisdictions and provider monopolies as 244 
part of wider ‘new public management’-style reforms (Ferlie 1996). Within this longer-term 245 
shift in the balance of logics, the period of our study, 2005-2011, can be seen as a particularly 246 
turbulent period of change, marking as it did the end of an unprecedented increase in 247 
healthcare spending in England, followed by a rapid retrenchment into austerity. Government 248 
funding for healthcare rose rapidly in the early 2000s (at a real-terms rate of 7% per annum) 249 
before plateauing and finally declining slightly relative to GDP (OECD 2014). The 250 
exogenous jolt of the global financial crisis from 2008 was partly responsible for this 251 
transition, but by this point the government had already begun to shift its focus from 252 
increasing capacity to increasing productivity (Secretary of State for Health 2008). In 2006 253 
the government required that the NHS’s £520-million deficit be transformed into a £250-254 
million surplus by 2008 (Day 2006), and as the financial situation became straitened, in 2009 255 
the NHS chief executive called for efficiency savings of 20% within five years (Nicholson 256 
2009). 257 
This turnaround in the financial environment translated into pronounced shifts in the 258 
organizational field, with the government seeking to increase the influence of market and 259 
corporate logics. Firstly, in line with the corporate logic, there was an increased emphasis on 260 
more managerial approaches to improving quality (e.g. care pathways, skill-mix 261 
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reconfiguration) (Secretary of State for Health 2008). Secondly, again following the 262 
corporate logic, the government introduced a more intensive regime of performance 263 
management of NHS provider organizations, including a pledge to reduce waiting lists to 18 264 
weeks, backed by the ability to invoke Draconian sanctions against ‘failing’ organizations 265 
(Lewis & Appleby 2006). Thirdly, following the market logic, the government took renewed 266 
steps to increase competition in the NHS. Although an internal market for acute healthcare 267 
services had existed since the early 1990s, further steps were taken from 2006 to extend the 268 
scope of the market, by increasing service provision outside traditional hospitals (Secretary of 269 
State for Health 2006), increasing the power of ‘commissioners’ (holders of healthcare 270 
budgets for a locality, responsible for paying for the healthcare needs of the local population) 271 
over providers (Ham 2008), and removing all responsibility for providing care from 272 
commissioning organizations, known as primary care trusts (PCTs), so that services were 273 
tendered competitively rather than offered ‘in house’. Thus there was a sustained effort to 274 
ensure that the logic of the market pervaded the entire healthcare system, including areas that 275 
had previously been immune to its influence. 276 
This period, then, was characterized by particularly intensive change, as government 277 
sought to adapt to the end of a period of sustained increases in funding by introducing 278 
evermore extensive market and managerial policies into the NHS system. Of course, changes 279 
in policy do not instantaneously give rise to a shift in the logics governing actors’ behaviour; 280 
nevertheless we can detect in these policies an attempt to strengthen the market and corporate 281 
logics—and correspondingly weaken the professional logic. At the start of the period, the 282 
NHS was enjoying unprecedented real-terms increases in funding; by the end, it was facing 283 
unprecedented levels of efficiency savings. A system of performance management that was 284 
emerging at the start had grown into a fully-fledged set of central-government prescriptions 285 
by the end, accompanied by the ability to ‘punish’ non-compliant or ineffective organizations 286 
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with sanctions or wholesale replacement of management. At the beginning, only secondary-287 
care services provided by hospitals were subject to a competitive system of resource 288 
allocation, but by the end all community-based services, previously provided in-house by 289 
PCTs, were exposed to the same expectation. The period was thus characterized by great 290 
institutional turbulence, with increasing centralization and formalization (Greenwood et al. 291 
2011; Pache & Santos 2010) of the market and corporate logics. 292 
Setting and methods 293 
Our paper follows the trajectory of four new service developments over this period, through a 294 
longitudinal understanding over the period 2005-2011 of how those responsible for leading 295 
the development of these services—the ‘focal actors’—and other stakeholders responded to 296 
the changing institutional environment. The four services in question had their roots in a 297 
national government initiative in 2004 which aimed to encourage the ‘mainstreaming’ of 298 
clinical-genetics knowledge across the English NHS. This initiative (Secretary of State for 299 
Health 2003) provided pump-priming funding to 27 pilot services, each of which sought to 300 
introduce a new approach to delivering genetics services in its locality—for example by 301 
changing the way risk assessment or counselling was provided—but maintaining professional 302 
control over this. Our team evaluated the initiative, studying the changes attempted in a 303 
theoretical sample of 11 of the services. The initiative ran on the basis that successful services 304 
would be sustained using local monies, and host organizations committed to this as a 305 
condition of funding. However, in the event, when pilot funding ended in 2007, only a 306 
minority of services were sustained, including just four of the 11 we studied (see Table 1). 307 
The challenges inherent in sustaining organizational innovations are an area of significant 308 
policy interest in the UK (e.g. Buchanan et al. 2007), and we therefore developed, and 309 
succeeded in obtaining external funding for, a follow-up study that revisited the four 310 
sustained services post-pilot, to examine in more detail what had made a difference in their 311 
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successful continuation. This paper derives from both the original evaluation and the follow-312 
up study, offering a longitudinal analysis of the work of actors involved in the four services 313 
covering the seven-year period 2005-2011. While we lack the data from the seven 314 
discontinued services to consider them in detail in this paper, Table 1 shows how they 315 
resemble and differ from our sample of four according to key variables, and briefly 316 
summarizes the reasons for their termination. 317 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 318 
For our original evaluation, our sample was driven by a theoretical approach to obtain 319 
variation in key variables of interest, inter alia host organization (e.g. hospitals versus 320 
primary-care organization), professional affiliation of focal actor (e.g. doctors, nurses), and 321 
disciplinary affiliation (e.g. specialist geneticists, other specialist clinicians, generalists). 322 
These variables are highlighted as pertinent in the existing literature (e.g. Battilana 2011); 323 
they were supplemented in our sampling strategy by other variables raised as of potential 324 
significance in discussions with our funder, such as clinical focus of the service and amount 325 
of funding allocated. Cases exhibiting various combinations of these variables were sampled 326 
to facilitate cross-case comparison. Our follow-up study included all sites from this original 327 
sample that were sustained with further funding beyond the pilot period (4/11). While they 328 
differ in detail, all four embodied a professionally led approach to improving genetics 329 
provision by breaking down organizational boundaries (e.g. between specialisms or between 330 
primary and secondary care) that gave rise to disjointed provision. Given that the focal actors 331 
in each case were successful in obtaining post-pilot funding where their peers in the other 332 
seven services failed, they could be seen as exceptional; but as our findings demonstrate, they 333 
did not have significant power over local decision-making. In one site (Bolbourne), ongoing 334 
funding ceased after six months; in the other three, it continues today. 335 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 336 
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Table 2 summarizes the four cases. Of particular note in the composition of our sample 337 
are the similarities and differences in two dimensions: professional allegiance of focal actor; 338 
and organizational host. Whereas Ashover’s focal actor was a nurse by training who had 339 
more recently become involved in a managerial capacity in her organization, the other three 340 
cases were led by physicians of varying backgrounds. The focal actor in Bolbourne was a 341 
general practitioner (family physician), while Carsridge was led by a clinical geneticist and 342 
Dovington by a specialist physician in the ‘mainstream’ clinical area into which genetics 343 
provision was being incorporated (we leave this unspecified to protect participant 344 
anonymity). Nurses are of lower status than doctors in English healthcare as worldwide 345 
(Battilana 2011); the intraprofessional hierarchy within medicine tends to place specialists 346 
above generalists, although the changes afoot in the English system explicitly sought to raise 347 
the standing of general practitioners and increase their influence on resource allocation 348 
(Secretary of State for Health 2006). The host organizations in Ashover and Bolbourne were 349 
both primary care organizations: PCTs responsible for budget-holding and resource 350 
allocation, but which also at the start of the period provided some services in-house, 351 
including these genetics services. Carsridge and Dovington’s services were hosted by acute 352 
hospital trusts: large hospital organizations providing services to the populations covered by 353 
several PCTs. 354 
Both studies used a combination of qualitative methods, drawing primarily on in-depth 355 
interviews with key actors (e.g. focal actors, others involved in service delivery, those in key 356 
decision-making and budget-holding roles beyond the services), supplemented by 357 
observational data and document collection and analysis. In total, across the two studies, we 358 
undertook 83 interviews over four time points, broken down as shown in Table 2. For the 359 
original evaluation, we undertook the majority of interviews in 2005-6 (hereafter referred to 360 
as T1), with follow-up interviews in 2008 (T2). For the second study, we undertook further 361 
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interviews in 2010 (T3) and 2011 (T4). Thus our data offer a longitudinal perspective on the 362 
trajectories of the four cases spanning seven years, albeit with data collection unevenly 363 
distributed across the period. Interviews ranged from approximately 30 to 130 minutes, with 364 
an average length of around one hour. Our topic guide in the original evaluation covered a 365 
wide range of issues, most notably for this paper the rationale for the service, how it related 366 
to and modified existing provision, relationships with key stakeholders and organizations, 367 
plans for the future, and (at T2) progress towards maintaining provision post-pilot. In the 368 
follow-up study our topic guide focused more specifically on the trials and tribulations of 369 
sustaining these small service innovations in a changing environment, the degree to which 370 
they had evolved in their service models, and the organizational, financial and relational work 371 
that had been done and was anticipated to maintain their existence. 372 
All interviews were transcribed in full. They were analysed using an approach informed 373 
by the constant-comparative method (Charmaz 2007), with specific attention directed 374 
towards certain ‘sensitizing concepts’—ideas that had informed our thinking in developing 375 
the study, derived from prior conversations, analysis of policy documents, and the existing 376 
literature on healthcare and organizational change—covering the social, professional, 377 
organizational and policy influences on service innovation and sustainability. We thus 378 
developed themes both inductively and deductively, to cover issues derived from existing 379 
conceptual frameworks, but also issues that emerged from close, repeated readings of the data 380 
sources. GPM and SW both read the source materials several times over, and GPM then led 381 
coding and analysis using NVivo software. This involved an initial ‘broad-brush’ coding of 382 
all documents to identify portions that offered potential insights for the purpose of this paper 383 
(since a substantial proportion of the material from the original evaluation was not relevant), 384 
informed by our existing knowledge. In discussion with the other authors, GPM then 385 
undertook several rounds of more refined, inductive coding, firstly coding items in terms of 386 
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the actions described by interviewees in relation to the development and sustaining of the 387 
services (Charmaz 2007), and then a further round of more theoretically oriented coding that 388 
sought to identify the influence and enactment of different logics in the activities 389 
interviewees described and the way they justified them. He then developed case histories 390 
describing the trajectories of the four cases over the period studied, which he discussed with 391 
co-authors before returning for a final round of coding, merging some existing codes and 392 
disaggregating others. 393 
Findings 394 
We present our findings over three sections. First, we examine the way the services were set 395 
up, and the impact of the rapid shift in the policy landscape for the continued legitimacy of 396 
services premised on a professional logic. Next, we consider the focal actors’ response to this 397 
challenge, which was differentially successful across the four cases, with very different 398 
outcomes in terms of the logics that were most evident in actors’ behaviour. Finally, we 399 
explore the reasons for this. By examining the data from across the cases in more detail, we 400 
suggest that the answer lies neither in the constellation of logics present in the field, nor 401 
solely in the creative capacity of the focal actors to make instrumental use of these logics, but 402 
in a confluence of micro- and macro-level circumstances, mediated at the meso 403 
(organizational) level, that meant that institutional repertoires that were accessible and held 404 
legitimacy in some cases were beyond the reach of focal actors in others. 405 
Professionally led services and shifting institutional logics 406 
When originally designed and initiated in 2004 through central government funding, all four 407 
services embraced a model premised on professional ownership and accountability. The 408 
white paper that announced the initiative had emphasised the role of clinical professionals in 409 
devising new genetics services (Secretary of State for Health 2003), and accordingly, all the 410 
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projects funded were led by clinicians, not managers—primarily clinical geneticists, but also 411 
other physicians, and nurses. Focal actors emphasised the centrality of a professional ethic in 412 
their approaches to delivering the new services, though in slightly different ways. In 413 
Carsridge and Dovington, they stressed the importance of ensuring that genetic knowledge 414 
was mainstreamed in a way that maintained or enhanced specialist involvement, rather than 415 
reducing it to a protocolized approach that might be more in line with the corporate logic. In 416 
the two primary-care cases, Ashover and Bolbourne, the emphasis was on integrating 417 
genetics into a generalist model of care, emphasising holism and the wider public health: 418 
“We were aware right from the early stages that patients really didn’t get a terribly 419 
good deal in terms of any kind of comprehensive service. There was very little 420 
continuity and I thought we could do a better job.” (Focal actor (mainstream 421 
physician), Dovington, T1) 422 
“Anybody who’s concerned that they’ve got a family history of cancer and are at risk 423 
can be referred into our service. […] We also do a lot of health promotion so we don’t 424 
actually just talk about cancer, we also talk about things related to cancer like diet, 425 
like giving up smoking, sunbathing, those types of things.” (Focal actor (nurse-426 
manager), Ashover, T1) 427 
Each focal actor thus enacted the professional logic in the way they set up their service, albeit 428 
with variations on the theme reflecting their professional affiliation: it was presented in terms 429 
of esoteric expertise by the specialist physicians in Carsridge and Dovington, but in terms of 430 
holistic, generalist care by the nurse and family physician in Ashover and Bolbourne. 431 
 Each focal actor had obtained agreement in principle from their host organization to 432 
continue to fund the service following the pilot period. The shift in the policy landscape from 433 
2005, however, threw such plans into disarray. An increased emphasis on markets and 434 
targets, and the organizational changes that accompanied it, had a marked effect on genetics 435 
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service developments, and meant that commitments made years earlier counted for little: 436 
“We’ve gone from a position of completely unprecedented investment in the health 437 
service, where it was attractive to invest money in bits of the service which had not 438 
previously had large amounts of money invested in them. [… But now] we’re in a 439 
position where it’s not clear how we’re going to continue to provide what everybody 440 
would regard as core NHS services, [so] slightly unusual developments are much less 441 
easy to make.” (Director, genetics service, Bolbourne, T3) 442 
There was a tangible shift in the language of those in decision-making positions in all four 443 
cases, towards an acknowledgement of the need for parsimony and demonstrable value. 444 
Professionally led services, in the view of these stakeholders, needed to address changing 445 
expectations around, for example, consumer-responsiveness in a competitive environment 446 
that mirrored the market logic: 447 
“The mistake I’ve seen a lot of services make is that they try really, really hard to 448 
establish because they think there’s a need to convince people, there’s a need to get 449 
funded, and they start seeing stakeholders, but then it stops. […] Products don’t 450 
survive in the market very long unless they inhabit the environment they’re in, learn 451 
from it and modify based on their clients’ continuously changing needs. And that’s 452 
what differentiates successful products from not-successful products.” (Director of 453 
Commissioning, Ashover, T3) 454 
As they reached the end of their pilot funding and considered how to maintain their services, 455 
therefore, focal actors found themselves in an environment that had changed markedly. The 456 
rise of the market and corporate logics in policy demanded evidence of cost savings or cost-457 
effectiveness, and this posed a threat to services founded on a different logic. But as we see 458 
next, the ultimate outcome of this shift in logics at the field level for the four services was 459 
very different. 460 
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The outcomes: domination; resistance; transformation 461 
Focal actors in all four cases worked hard to defend the services they had built, and secure 462 
continued funding for them in this changing environment, while ensuring they remained true 463 
to the professional logic on which the services had been founded. As noted above, all four 464 
succeeded initially in obtaining ongoing funding, in contrast to their peers. But beyond this, 465 
their success varied. 466 
At one extreme, in Bolbourne, despite the focal actor’s extensive efforts, local budget-467 
holders decided six months later to terminate their funding for the service. The focal actor, a 468 
family physician, made robust arguments for the continued importance of her service and the 469 
holistic understanding of the place of genetics in wider primary care that it promoted,. 470 
Alongside a costed business case, her efforts included compiling evidence of impact in the 471 
form of “e-mails, comments from other GPs saying, ‘This is great, the website’s fantastic, 472 
really good about having the advice line’,” “pictures in the [local] newspapers saying what a 473 
wonderful thing,” and lobbying commissioners and genetics specialists: “I think we covered 474 
most avenues really.” But as she bluntly reflected in her final (T4) interview: 475 
“From an outside perspective perhaps it seemed a bit woolly what I was doing, but I 476 
think it was actually much more worthwhile to focus my attentions in that way. It 477 
wasn’t as sexy and didn’t look quite as good; I wasn’t seeing all these patients.” 478 
Essentially, she found that arguments premised on a logic of professionalism failed to hold 479 
sway in an environment now dominated by concerns around efficiency and throughput 480 
(“seeing all these patients”). Her view was confirmed by the decision-makers themselves. 481 
The director of the genetics service felt that the focal actor was “selling something which […] 482 
commissioners didn’t want to buy” (T3). Another decision-maker was even franker: 483 
“It isn’t going to release huge savings, […] so when commissioners are prioritizing, it 484 
will not tick all the boxes I’m afraid. It’s undeniable that well informed GP specialists 485 
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able to support their GP colleagues can have an impact both on improving resources 486 
but more importantly making sure that patients get the right service at the right time, 487 
but I think in the current economic situation it’s going to be difficult to see many 488 
primary-care genetics services being established.” (Primary care commissioning lead, 489 
T3) 490 
Further work undertaken by the focal actor to resurrect her service following termination of 491 
funding was unsuccessful, and by the end of the study period she was resigned to the fact that 492 
“it’s just gone back to how it was. The website is the only lasting legacy” (T4). 493 
At the other extreme, in Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors were much more 494 
successful in defending the professional logic in the changing field, such that their services 495 
remained in place, largely unaffected by the wider environment and the rise of the market 496 
logic for the duration of the period studied. As the focal actor in Dovington put it, with some 497 
surprise, “actually to move us into the whole commissioning process and to make it 498 
sustainable was a far more fraught process potentially than it actually was” (T3). The model 499 
of service delivery continued to follow a professional logic, with patient-centredness taking 500 
precedence over throughput or efficiency savings: 501 
“Patient satisfaction is high, clinic sizes are relatively small although efficient, and 502 
time spent with medical staff and nursing staff is higher and so we get a much better 503 
patient experience and outcome with all of that. We’re always going to be able to be 504 
criticized on the basis that we’re providing a luxury service as opposed to an economy 505 
service, but they’re a very vulnerable group of patients.” (Clinical geneticist, T4) 506 
Similarly, in Carsridge, ongoing funding was secured and the service remained faithful to the 507 
original design, without any challenge to the professionally determined service model: “I 508 
don’t think there was ever any major problems: it just seemed to happen” (Genetic 509 
counsellor, T3). Only minor changes were instigated, such as adjustment of the skill mix to 510 
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enhance the professional responsibilities of the clinical staff: “the function of the team is 511 
exactly the same, but we have up-skilled one of the administrators to take some of the more 512 
mundane activities from [the clinicians]. And I suppose that’s the biggest change actually” 513 
(Focal actor (clinical geneticist), T3). Whereas in Bolbourne, adherence to the professional 514 
logic meant that the service was seen as anachronistic by budget-holders (“selling something 515 
which […] commissioners didn’t want to buy”), the services in Carsridge and Dovington 516 
retained legitimacy with key decision-makers despite their avowedly professionally driven 517 
ethos: 518 
“To me it’s actually really pretty streamlined, a very efficient service. […] What 519 
they’ve done in terms of bringing things up into the twenty-first century is of value to 520 
the population, so I think they provide a valuable service.” (Clinical director, 521 
Carsridge, T3) 522 
Between the contrasting experiences of Bolbourne, and Carsridge and Dovington, lay 523 
Ashover’s. Here, funding was sustained throughout the period, but achieving this required 524 
fundamental changes to the ethos and delivery model of the service. At the behest of local 525 
decision-makers, the original holistic, public-health focus of the service gave way to 526 
something much narrower in remit, and better aligned with corporate and market expectations 527 
around efficiency and performance against specific measures. The focal actor was expected 528 
to agree to a “service specification” with “specific key performance indicators” developed 529 
with managers, “which I disagreed with but had to put them forward anyway” (T4). The 530 
service was incorporated into a managed care pathway, with a much more tightly defined 531 
service-level agreement that focused on triaging patients at possible risk of inherited cancer. 532 
Alongside this, more forensic examination of the service’s activities was introduced: “we 533 
have now a scoring of interventions, sort of whether it’s a low intervention or a high 534 
intervention, […] and they’re now reviewing that data collection as well, so there’ll be a 535 
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whole new system coming out” (Focal actor (nurse-manager), T4). The positioning of the 536 
service within a managed pathway, along with this extra scrutiny and oversight for managers 537 
and commissioners, gave the service legitimacy with key decision-makers. It was now 538 
aligned with normative conceptualizations of how to deliver efficient and well managed 539 
healthcare, as part of a defined pathway that offered a cheaper alternative to hospital-based 540 
care: 541 
“Community services we know are darn site cheaper than secondary and tertiary care 542 
services. […] It’s a community-led service, you know, and necessarily, it’s broken 543 
down the boundaries between primary care and secondary care. So it’s a pathway-544 
driven service from the community which ticks all the boxes at the moment of things 545 
being community-driven, closer to home.” (Associate medical director, T3) 546 
Besides more focused performance management, this also brought a much stricter set of 547 
eligibility criteria for patients. For example, the service took fewer self-referrals from worried 548 
patients who had not been screened by their family physicians, and was contemplating 549 
stopping self-referrals altogether since budget-holders were unlikely to see this is as 550 
appropriate expenditure: 551 
“When we first started in the pilot phase, it was very much self-referrals that 552 
outweighed any professional referrals. Whereas now I would say that’s reversed and 553 
self-referrals probably come at the bottom of the referral rate and it’s secondary-care 554 
and GP referrals that probably top. […] I don’t know how GPs will feel about patients 555 
referring themselves in, because they’re not going to have control of that budget. 556 
(Focal actor (nurse-manager), T4) 557 
This process of adaptation to the new realities of the market continued through time. Between 558 
T3 and T4, as part of its continued funding, the service was incorporated into a different 559 
organization with much greater managerial capacity than its original host, and with a strong 560 
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market orientation: 561 
“[New host organization] have an operating model which they would apply to all of 562 
their products. So […] they’ll have to change certain aspects of the way they just run 563 
the service to fit in with their corporate model. […] If they can’t robustly describe the 564 
value this service would have on the whole of cancer care, then the more likely the 565 
risk that this service won’t be commissioned.” (Commissioner, T3) 566 
 The future for the service looked more secure—it had reinvented itself as part of an 567 
integrated care pathway with a tightly defined remit and expectations around efficient 568 
resource use—but this had meant fundamental changes to its service-delivery model. From 569 
her original affiliation with the professional logic, the focal actor had been forced to 570 
fundamentally realign herself to the corporate and market logics, in terms of both the 571 
discursive justification, and the service provided. 572 
Making sense of the contrasting outcomes 573 
From similar starting positions, then, the four cases exhibited divergent trajectories. While 574 
the focal actors in Carsridge and Dovington continued to espouse the professional logic, and 575 
maintained services formed in a professional image despite the changing environment, in 576 
Bolbourne the focal actor’s fidelity to the professional logic saw her service terminated, while 577 
in Ashover the focal actor had to embrace alternative logics to secure her service’s future (see 578 
also Table 3). How might these divergent outcomes be explained? 579 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 580 
In all four cases, hard evidence about the efficiency or effectiveness of the services was 581 
in short supply (see self-citation). Evidence of this nature was difficult for focal actors to 582 
generate—partly because they had never devised their services with such a crudely economic 583 
calculus in mind, but also because generating such evidence was difficult in genetics with its 584 
long-term, not short-term, outcomes: “it’s difficult to demonstrate their value or the amount 585 
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of money they’re saving,” as a manager in Carsridge acknowledged (T3). Explanations for the 586 
divergent outcomes premised on a rationalistic understanding of organizational decision-587 
making can therefore be discounted. 588 
Yet while the services in Ashover, Carsridge and Dovington may have been no more 589 
cost-effective than that in Bolbourne, we have seen that as far as key decision-makers were 590 
concerned, they were more in keeping with how a service of this nature should look. 591 
Although all services lacked a clear economic rationale that would offer a firm alignment 592 
with the expectations of the market logic, this was more problematic for some than others. 593 
From our data, a number of explanations for this might be invoked, with differing degrees of 594 
support. 595 
First, it might be argued that the divergent outcomes were down to the differential skill 596 
of the focal actors in making the case for their services. Other micro-level studies have noted 597 
the importance of actors who are “highly reflexive and somewhat creative in interpreting the 598 
pressures for institutional change” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015; cf. Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; 599 
self-citation), and going against the ‘institutional grain’ clearly requires capacity for lateral 600 
thinking and persuasive ability. There was some support for this notion in our data. One 601 
decision-maker in Bolbourne intimated that the focal actor did not have “the right personality 602 
to go out there and engage people and get people stirred up” (T3). However, it was clearly not 603 
the case that any of the focal actors was naïve about the changing environment they were 604 
facing: over the course of our four interviews with each of them, they demonstrated an astute, 605 
reflexive understanding the changing healthcare system and the risks this posed to their 606 
services. And of course, unlike the seven other services sampled in our original evaluation, 607 
these focal actors had at least obtained initial local funding beyond the pilot monies provided 608 
by central government. 609 
A second plausible explanation is that the status and power enjoyed by the focal actors 610 
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affected their ability to defy the vagaries of the shifting institutional prescriptions. Certainly 611 
the position of nurses in terms of professional status, authority and autonomy is weaker than 612 
that of physicians, in England and elsewhere (see, e.g., Battilana 2011). Socio-demographic 613 
characteristics such as gender may also contribute to this positional power. But while 614 
Ashover’s focal actor was a (white, female) nurse, there was little to differentiate the status of 615 
those in Bolbourne, Carsridge and Dovington, all of whom were doctors (white and female in 616 
Bolbourne and Dovington, white and male in Carsridge), albeit from different subspecialities. 617 
Indeed, if anything, the changes afoot over the study period—which saw more powers given 618 
to family physicians in terms of funding allocation, and encouragement of community-based 619 
over hospital-based care (Secretary of State for Health 2006)—should have raised the power 620 
of Bolbourne’s focal actor vis-à-vis that of Carsridge and Dovington’s. 621 
A more convincing and comprehensive explanation is possible if we focus on neither 622 
actors’ social position nor their creative capacity per se, but on the consequences for these of 623 
the wider changes taking place in the field at the time. While the rise of the market logic over 624 
the period of the study applied equally across the English healthcare field, its effects at an 625 
organizational level were unequal. For the primary-care organizations that hosted the services 626 
in Ashover and Bolbourne, the rise of the market was unprecedented, and brought significant 627 
structural changes. As commissioning organizations (budget holders for the healthcare needs 628 
of the local population), they were required to relinquish their responsibility for service 629 
provision to enable competition for services that had been provided in-house. The services 630 
that had been a part of these organizations, including Ashover’s and Bolbourne’s genetics 631 
services, had to be reconstituted as financially independent standalone bodies, or incorporated 632 
into existing provider organizations. Consequently, the focal actors in Ashover and 633 
Bolbourne found themselves in the midst of a complicated process of organizational 634 
disengagement, and were cut adrift from their organizational sponsors. The focal actor in 635 
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Ashover found that her new managers “didn’t have as much insight into the service and were 636 
less committed to seeing it expand” (T3), while in Bolbourne, the service’s manager had “less 637 
direct involvement” in the service, “although because there was not really anyone else to do it 638 
I did carry on to an extent” (T3). Further, and more critically, the focal actors were exposed to 639 
a range of expectations associated with the market logic that were foreign to them—and 640 
lacked the managerial support necessary to coherently argue their case in response. 641 
On the face of it, this challenge also applied to Carsridge and Dovington. However, 642 
here the services were hosted by hospitals with long experience of participating in a 643 
competitive market—and this equipped them much better to deal with the changing 644 
expectations of the new regime. The primary-care organizations in which Ashover’s and 645 
Bolbourne’s focal actors worked had only ever encountered the competitive market as budget 646 
holders, choosing between competing bids: making a business case as a potential contractor 647 
was not something they had experienced before. As hospitals, the organizations in Carsridge 648 
and Dovington had long experience of a competitive market for secondary care that stretched 649 
back into the 1990s. Thus while the market-oriented shifts were just as dazzling to the focal 650 
actors themselves, they were surrounded by an established managerial infrastructure that was 651 
adept at managing such demands, and did not have to contend with rapid organizational 652 
change. They could rely instead on extensive managerial support—an instantiation of the 653 
corporate logic with its focus on the monitoring, audit and justification of professional 654 
activity—to deal with such shifts. 655 
The consequences for the ability of the focal actors to defend their services were 656 
profound. In Ashover and Bolbourne, they found themselves with little support and little idea 657 
of how to make a case for themselves: 658 
“Just after the pilot finished once we’d secured ongoing funding there was the 659 
commissioner-provider split, so the service went into mainstream services in the 660 
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provider arm. […] I don't mean to sound derogatory, but I suppose the senior 661 
managers within the provider arm didn’t have as much insight in to the service and 662 
were less committed to seeing it expand.” (Focal actor, Ashover, T3) 663 
“My final line manager, essentially he and I put together a business plan very much 664 
on our own, and we met with the medical director and the deputy medical director and 665 
we put our case.” (Focal actor, Bolbourne, T3) 666 
In Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors enjoyed the full support of their organizations’ 667 
corporate apparatus: 668 
“The key relationship going forward […] is the relationship between our service, the 669 
business planning directorate, and their relationship with whatever commissioner 670 
organization exists after that, because we as a clinical service can’t keep up with 671 
changes in commissioning. But the business planning section do. And it’s that 672 
relationship that’s really important.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T2) 673 
“We have had no direct dealings with commissioners at any stage, because we are 674 
part of [a wider funding] envelope, from the point of view of the service that’s 675 
provided, it’s completely embedded in [the wider service].” (Focal actor, Dovington, 676 
T4) 677 
Intriguingly, then, in Carsridge and Dovington, the presence of a well established corporate 678 
logic, manifest in the activities of the hospitals’ dedicated business-planning staff, shielded 679 
the focal actors from the full force of the market logic, and enabled them to continue to enact 680 
the professional logic in the way they ran their services. Focal actors here could rely on 681 
others around them, carriers of the corporate logic but also well versed in the language of the 682 
market logic and the expectations of financial decision-makers, to frame their projects 683 
accordingly and deflect challenges: 684 
“What we’ve been doing is pulling together our experience and our outcomes in a 685 
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brief report that we can send to the business-planning department of this hospital, so 686 
that they can use that in their negotiations.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T3) 687 
In the absence of such support, Ashover and Bolbourne faced greater challenges. Bolbourne’s 688 
focal actor floundered, but in Ashover the focal actor was able to draw on her experience as a 689 
manager—her dual embeddedness in the professional and corporate logics (Pache & Santos 690 
2013)—to reframe her service. As we have seen, though, this came at the cost of 691 
transforming the service model itself, so that it was premised not on a professional logic but 692 
on notions of efficiency and throughput. For all four focal actors, however, the ability and 693 
opportunity to invoke and make advantageous use of logics was heavily shaped—one might 694 
even say structured—by influences beyond their capacity and social position as individual 695 
agents, but below the level of the field as a whole. Organizational context and the nature of 696 
their relationship with other agents—themselves affiliated with other logics—were crucial 697 
mediators of the relationship between field-level configuration of logics and individual-level 698 
autonomy. 699 
Discussion 700 
Our paper seeks to bridge macro-level and micro-level work on responses to institutional 701 
complexity by using comparative, longitudinal analysis to examine the conditions under 702 
which actors are able to defy changing institutional prescriptions. In particular, we show that 703 
a common ‘constellation’ of institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 704 
2013) could give rise to divergent outcomes at the level of practice. Constellations are thus 705 
not just ‘celestial’ features of the field-level ‘sky’: the relationship between logics was also 706 
realized through the work of actors on the ‘ground’. Most notably, whereas the corporate 707 
logic aligned, as the literature predicts (Thornton 2002; [self-citation]), with the market logic 708 
in some cases, in others it proved a remarkably robust defence for the professional logic 709 
against the market logic. But none of the actors had free rein to pick and choose from the 710 
30 
 
plurality of logics present in this complex field. Rather, influences above the level of the 711 
actor but below that of the field were important mediators and shapers of autonomy.  712 
As noted above, much of the micro-level work on the enactment of institutional logics 713 
‘at the coalface’ has focused on the ‘hypermuscular’ work of institutional entrepreneurs with 714 
unusual degrees of power, deriving from their social position, their “reflexivity or insight” 715 
and “their superior political and social skills” (Hardy & Maguire 2008, p.211). But even 716 
where studies have looked at the day-to-day work of lower-profile actors, they have often 717 
found a high level of autonomy, and attributed this to the creative capacity or social position 718 
of the individuals studied. For example, Bévort and Suddaby (2015) suggest that liberation 719 
from institutional prescriptions “appears to rest in the differential ability of some individuals 720 
in a common field to interpret the phenomenological fragility of logics and to be somewhat 721 
immune to their ‘totalizing’ cognitive influence.” Greenwood et al. (2011, p.349), 722 
summarizing the state of the field, submit that the ability to advance the prescriptions of one 723 
logic over others is in part “a function of how logics are given voice within the organization; 724 
but the ability of a voice to be heard is linked to the influence of that logic’s field-level 725 
proponents over resources.” One way or another, these studies suggest that the ability to 726 
selectively enact logics derives primarily from some combination of status and creativity. But 727 
as Hallett (2010, p.67) acknowledges, this ability is produced (and denied) at a “supra-728 
individual,” social level. And a key level at which this process takes place, we argue, is the 729 
organizational level, and particularly the way in which logics are configured and represented 730 
in organizational processes and personnel. 731 
Others have shown how organizations can act as ‘filters’, whereby different 732 
organizational units are subject to different institutional logics. Binder (2007, p.562), for 733 
example, finds that actors in different sections of the community organization she studied 734 
enact different logics, since different constellations of logics predominate: those in the 735 
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housing department follow a more corporate logic, since “there are no countervailing 736 
institutional logics that staff in this department draw on.” This reflects the findings of others 737 
about how in some fields, institutional complexity is ‘segmented’: some prescriptions apply 738 
to one group of actors; others to another (e.g. Pache & Santos 2010). In other settings, 739 
collaboration across logics may be a prerequisite for organizational functioning (e.g. 740 
McPherson & Sauder 2013; Smets et al. 2015). What we witness in this study, however, is a 741 
combination of what Besharov and Smith (2014) call high centrality and low compatibility: a 742 
field characterized by multiple institutional logics which must all be adhered to, and yet are 743 
mutually conflicting. This results in what they term ‘conflicted’ organizations, and they 744 
recount many examples from the literature of where this has led to organizational dysfunction 745 
or even disintegration. Yet, as Besharov and Smith (2014) argue, centrality and compatibility 746 
are not determined only at the field level: they are also a function of organizational form. 747 
Since ‘structurally differentiated hybrids’—in which the influences of different logics sit 748 
side-by-side, in different units in the same organization (Greenwood et al. 2011)—are 749 
especially vulnerable to dysfunction (e.g. Battilana & Dorado 2010; Greenwood et al. 2011), 750 
Besharov and Smith suggest two organizational interventions to mitigate this: recruiting 751 
personnel without prior institutional affiliations (to move from a structurally differentiated 752 
hybrid towards a blended hybrid, thereby reducing logic incompatibility), or reducing 753 
resource dependency by shifting strategic focus (to diminish the number of logics that must 754 
be accounted for, thereby reducing logic centrality). But these are not options for all 755 
organizations, particularly in the public services, where structural differentiation is itself 756 
necessary for legitimacy (and so blending is difficult to achieve) (see Greenwood et al. 2011, 757 
p.355), and organizational objectives are externally dictated (and so shifting strategic focus is 758 
not tenable). Logics’ influence cannot always be reduced in this way. 759 
What our findings suggest is how the tension between logics can be managed even 760 
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where structural differentiation, so prone to disintegration, is necessary.  What appears 761 
crucial is the internal configuration of structurally differentiated units.  Thus in Carsridge and 762 
Dovington, the presence of carriers of the corporate logic in a separate unit—who could 763 
intervene actively to moderate its influence on their professional colleagues—paradoxically 764 
helped to secure latitude for the focal actors; the lack of such a buffering influence in 765 
Ashover and Bolbourne resulted in constraint.
6
 We suggest, therefore, that at least in public-766 
service organizations, efforts to hire or socialize ‘non-affiliated’ staff to create blended 767 
hybrids that increase compatibility, or realign mission to reduce logic centrality, are likely to 768 
be forlorn or even counterproductive: attention might be more appropriately addressed to 769 
developing a cordial, interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship between carriers of 770 
logics in structurally differentiated units. Indeed, in Ashover the focal actor’s socialization (or 771 
dual embeddedness) within both the professional and the corporate logic proved a mixed 772 
blessing, enabling the service to continue but only through transformation in its character. 773 
Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005, p.359) echo Besharov and Smith’s (2014) contention that 774 
staff with multiple institutional affiliations can help to reduce incompatibility and increase 775 
autonomy: “the more contexts individuals are embedded in, the more options they have 776 
available for transposing practices.” But while this helped Ashover’s focal actor avoid the 777 
termination of the service that occurred in Bolbourne, it offered her substantially less 778 
discretion than that enjoyed by the focal actors in Carsridge and Dovington. Dual 779 
embeddedness may then improve actors’ access to different logics, but it does not necessarily 780 
give them freedom of choice in enacting them. The configuration of organizations and the 781 
carriers of logics within them, not just their composition, matters, and as such structurally 782 
                                                          
6
 It might be noted in passing that of the seven services included in the original evaluation 
which did not obtain post-pilot funding, three had organizational set-ups involving 
collaboration between two or more host organizations (see Table 1). This may have added 
complication to the relationship among logics and their carriers, accounting in part for their 
failure to secure post-pilot funding, though we do not have the data to sustain this argument.  
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differentiated hybrid arrangements have the potential, at least, to reconcile conflicting logics 783 
as effectively as blended hybrids. 784 
Understood this way, the findings of other micro-level studies that have emphasised the 785 
ingenuity of individual actors might be seen in a slightly different light. For example, Murray 786 
(2010, p.379) sees the response of scientists to unfamiliar commercial pressures arising from 787 
the patenting of the genetic modification of ‘OncoMouse’ as the “sophisticated [production] 788 
of new hybrids,” in which the “expertise that allows [key actors] to transpose elements from 789 
each logic” to protect the autonomy of science was crucial. Yet it is also evident from her 790 
study that the privileged access to a wider, supportive, infrastructure—including “lawyers, 791 
TTO professionals, university counsel, and corporate executives”—was also critical to this 792 
endeavour: it was not expertise or status alone that enabled autonomy. McPherson and Sauder 793 
(2013, p.186) show that actors in a drugs court draw relatively freely upon a “shared toolkit” 794 
of logics in pursuit of their interests, but some actors are better placed than others to do so: 795 
the relational position of probation officers means they occupy a position of ‘brokerage’ that 796 
allows them privileged access to the ‘home’ logics of others, even though they lack the status 797 
of other professional groups in the court.
7
 Heimer (1999, p.61) argues that in disputes about 798 
the care of neonates in intensive care, doctors’ arguments tend to overpower those of other 799 
actors because they are on their home turf, with greater knowledge of “how to get problems 800 
onto the agenda, how to propose their solutions in a persuasive way” and so on. She thus 801 
concludes that “the ranking of various professions [will shape] outcomes” of such disputes; 802 
“laws that are useful to high status professionals like physicians are more likely to be 803 
incorporated into NICU routines than laws that might be useful to lower status staff” (Heimer 804 
1999, p.62). But our findings show that it is more than simple professional hierarchy that is 805 
important here: in itself, it is no guarantee of greater legitimacy, as the contrasting 806 
                                                          
7
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this connection to our attention. 
34 
 
experiences of Ashover’s nurse and Bolbourne’s physician indicate. It was perhaps not then 807 
physicians’ position as “high status professionals” per se that was important in Heimer’s 808 
study, but the privileged access to wider resources and networks that this afforded. 809 
We suggest, then, that organizations—and specifically the way organizations instantiate 810 
relationships between multiple logics—thus contribute crucially not just to the availability of 811 
logics at individual level, but also to the manner in which they become available: the degree 812 
to which the appearance of a logic constrains or enables autonomy. Broadly, we propose 813 
three overarching alternative ways organizations might mediate the influence of logics, 814 
deploying a physics-based metaphor that we hope helps to convey the means by which 815 
different organizational forms may intervene in the transmission of logics. First, 816 
organizations may deflect logics, protecting those within them from the need to align with 817 
logical prescriptions. We did not see this in our study, but other studies (Binder 2007; Pache 818 
& Santos 2010; Jones 1999), where organizations have the power to defy institutional 819 
expectations or buffer their members from the influence of competing logics, might be 820 
conceptualized in this way. Second, they may simply transmit logics, so that prescriptions are 821 
largely unmediated and it is left to individual-level actors to resolve (or fail to resolve) the 822 
contradictions between competing logics. We see this in Ashover and Bolbourne, where the 823 
professional actors were left exposed to the vagaries of new prescriptions from the market 824 
logic in the absence of an effective corporate buffer. Third, they may refract logics, altering 825 
or refocusing their influence and thereby offering some shield to individuals and opportunity 826 
for autonomy. We see this in Carsridge and Dovington, where a functional relationship 827 
between carriers of the corporate and professional logics saw the former shield the latter from 828 
some aspects of new institutional prescriptions, such that they retained autonomy. The notion 829 
of refraction has some similarities with one of the oldest concepts in the institutionalist 830 
repertoire, that of decoupling (Meyer & Rowan 1977). However, as our choice of metaphor 831 
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indicates, we consider this to be more than a simple matter of one organizational unit 832 
providing legitimacy in the terms of the corporate logic, while another, decoupled unit 833 
continues its own work untainted. Rather, by refraction we mean that the institutional logic, 834 
like white light passing through a prism, is slowed, bent or even dispersed into its component 835 
parts. Thus in the cases of Carsridge and Dovington, staff in business-planning units were 836 
able to translate the requirements of the market and corporate logics into terms 837 
comprehensible to the services’ professional leads, and then reframe the professional leads’ 838 
cases back into terms that would satisfy the expectations of the corporate and market logics. 839 
This was not so much a decoupling, then, as a conscious, selective coupling. Though carriers 840 
of the corporate logic, the relationship between these business-planning units and 841 
professional clinicians was organized in a way that encouraged co-operation, enabling this 842 
refraction to take place—in stark contrast to the situation in Ashover and Bolbourne. The 843 
notions of deflection, transmission and refraction represent a tentative typology requiring 844 
validation and further development, but might serve as an initial touchstone for further 845 
investigation of the organizational-level mediation of institutional logics. 846 
For all four focal actors, then, creative capacity, professional status and embeddedness 847 
in the rules and norms of different logics were only as good as the organizational setting and 848 
social relationships they enjoyed. Autonomy was constrained where these were lacking and 849 
enabled when these were favourable. Over the period studied, institutional prescriptions were 850 
consolidated, with greater centralization of logics and the ascendency of market and 851 
corporate logics that seemed incompatible with the professional logic. Both of these changes 852 
should work to constrain actors’ autonomy. Nevertheless, meso-level features of 853 
organizations within the field made a significant difference to the consequences for actors, 854 
maintaining latitude for some while others faced constraint (cf. Besharov & Smith 2014). We 855 
contend that attending to these features could go a long way towards explaining the 856 
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disjuncture between macro- and micro-level findings about the partial autonomy afforded to 857 
professionals at the coalface. 858 
Our analysis offers several suggestions for future research. In particular, we suggest 859 
that more attention to the meso-level mediators of agency, perhaps building on the typology 860 
we outline above, would help to understand how the prescriptions and openings for discretion 861 
at the field level do or do not translate into opportunities at the individual level. Further work 862 
that combines a detailed, phenomenological understanding of micro-level activity with 863 
comparison of similar or divergent contexts would be helpful. Relatedly, further conceptual 864 
development of Thornton et al.’s (2012, p.7) notion of “avenues for partial autonomy” would 865 
be helpful in reconciling macro- and micro-level work in the field of neo-institutionalism. As 866 
noted above, while many macro-level studies claim to show how institutional complexity 867 
affords opportunities for autonomy, they often remain steadfastly structuralist in the way they 868 
describe these (e.g. Waldorff et al. 2013). Finally, we strongly endorse Greenwood et al.’s 869 
(2011) call for research that embraces the impact of the coexistence of more than two logics, 870 
and Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) point that what constitutes a logic needs to be carefully 871 
considered by those seeking to study their effects. The market and corporate logics appear, on 872 
the face of it, to present a concerted threat to the professional logic in rapidly changing fields 873 
such as healthcare. Indeed, others have analysed their impact collectively: for example Reay 874 
and Hinings’ (2005, p.358) logic of ‘business-like healthcare’ combines elements of both. 875 
But we show that the experience of the two logics can diverge in different contexts, and that 876 
they do not necessarily operate synergistically in practice. We therefore recommend careful 877 
disaggregation of logics (and perhaps their constituent elements) in future studies. 878 
Conclusion 879 
Through comparative study of the trajectories of four change initiatives in a complex 880 
organizational field, we have sought in this paper to contribute to the institutional logics 881 
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literature by examining the divergent consequences of a common constellation of logics for 882 
actors in different organizational contexts. Actor autonomy, so often valorized in micro-level 883 
studies of institutional logics in action, depended greatly on mediating factors at the meso 884 
level: opportunities for autonomy were determined neither at the field level nor in the status 885 
and creativity of individual actors. Rather, organizations—not just as containers of carriers of 886 
logics (Besharov & Smith 2014) but more importantly, as configurations of relationships 887 
between those carriers—constituted a prism which could act to transmit field-level 888 
institutional prescriptions into micro-level constraints, or refract them into something more 889 
pliable and productive. Further research taking a ‘nested’ case-study approach—studying 890 
multiple cases across two more fields where logics are arranged in different constellations—891 
may be fruitful in adding further nuance to our understanding of how logics facilitate or 892 
obstruct discretion, and with what consequences for day-to-day practice and indeed 893 
reproduction and change in organizational fields. 894 
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Table 1: Overview of the 11 pilots included in the original evaluation 1016 
 Stream Pilot lead Profession 
of lead 
Host organization(s) Continued 
post-pilot? 
Reasons for non-continuation 
Ashover Cancer genetics  Nurse by background; 
now manager 
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Bolbourne General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner  Physician Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Carsridge Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Hospital organization Yes  
Dovington Service development Specialist physician Physician Hospital organization Yes  
E Cancer genetics Nurse Nurse Consortium of primary 
care organizations 
No Reconfiguration of primary care 
organizations and consequent failure to 
agree to continued funding 
F Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Two hospital 
organizations 
No Failure to agree to continued funding 
(scaled down version maintained in one 
hospital) 
G Service development Specialist physician Physician Three hospital 
organizations 
No Conflict over allocation of resources and 
professional roles among host organizations 
leads to agreement to discontinue 
H Service development Specialist physician Nurse Hospital organization No Project ceased at end of funding; results 
included in guidelines for referrals to 
genetics service 
I General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Always intended to be a time-limited 
educational intervention 
J General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Geneticists refuse to support (see [self-
citation]) 
K General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Limited ongoing ‘associate’ role under 
geneticist super vision (see [self-citation]) 
 1017 
  1018 
42 
 
Table 2: Summary of the four cases 1019 
 Service model Profession of 
focal actor 
Initial host Number of interviews 
T1 T2 T3 T4 Total 
Ashover Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage using primary care-based staff, and wider health-promotion advice aimed 
at high-risk groups  
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
12 
 
2 
 
12 
 
2 
 
28 
Bolbourne General practitioner with a special interest: provides training and advice to other 
GPs to inform proper management and referral of patients with suspected 
genetic conditions 
Physician Primary care 
organization 
5 2 7 1 15 
Carsridge Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage provided by secondary care-based staff, replacing ad hoc provision by 
oncologists and surgeons 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
12 2 10 2 26 
Dovington New multidisciplinary clinic, incorporating mainstream and specialist consultant-
led care, for a group with a genetic disorder previously seen in separate clinics 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
6 2 5 1 14 
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Table 3: The differential translation of institutional change across cases 
 Time Ashover Bolbourne Carsridge and Dovington 
Focal actor  Nurse/manager Physician Physician 
Organizational 
host 
 PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3); 
community provider organization (T4) 
PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3) Hospital organization 
Original logic 
espoused by 
focal actors 
T1 
(2005-6) 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring holistic care and 
addressing public health, rather than 
providing a narrow care pathway delivered 
by deskilled occupational group 
Professional 
Emphasis on utilizing broad skills of a family 
physician to facilitate holistic care, rather 
than replicating work done by lower-status 
occupational groups. 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring patient-centred care 
delivered by a highly skilled professional 
team, rather than a narrow care pathway 
delivered by deskilled occupational group 
Impact of rise of 
market logic 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic mitigates 
Response of 
focal actors 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Focal actor adapts behaviour to comply 
with market and corporate logics 
Focal actor defends alignment with 
professional logic 
Focal actors draw on corporate apparatus 
to shelter service from market logic 
Outcome T3-T4 
(2010-11) 
Service is transformed in character: 
reflects market and corporate logics 
Service is discontinued: focal actor’s 
defence fails to deflect market logic 
Services are maintained unaltered: 
corporate logic shields professional logic  
 
 
